Social Integration in the
“New” Berlin1
H i l a ry Silver
Sociology, Brown University
The newly constructed central district of the city of Berlin has
become a symbol of German national unity and restored pride.
Beyond the country’s borders, the city’s reunification connotes the
end of the Cold War, socialist dictatorship, the lingering divisions of
World War II, and the beginning of a new phase of European integra-
tion. The cluster of downtown “mega-projects”—the glitzy shopping
arcades of Friedrichstrasse, the new transportation infrastructures, the
spanking new government center along the renovated waterfront of
the Spree, and the internationally notable architecture of the multina-
tional corporate headquarters of Potsdamer Platz—have effaced the
long fault line of the Wall in a mere fifteen years.
The physical reunification of the “New Berlin” has received con-
siderable attention throughout the world, most of it focused on the
architecture and aesthetics of German identity.2 In public discourse,
the cultural significance of the material environment has far out-
weighed its economic and social import. Image-making is central to
the business of reconstructing the “new Berlin.”
As the capital of five different Germanys, Berlin represents the “unsta-
ble optic identity” of the nation, for it is the city where, more than any
other city, German nationalism and modernity have been staged and
restaged, represented and contested. Berlin is a city that cannot be
contained by marketing representations of time, of the “new.”3
Berlin’s bid to become a global city, a tourist destination, and the
center of Eastern Europe is now inscribed on the urban landscape.
The transformation of the local economy from an industrial one to a
government and service center is also evident in the lively arts and
cultural scene. The artistic sector includes dozens of renovated
German Politics and Society, Issue 81 Vol. 24, No. 4, Winter2006 1
10.3167/gps.2006.240401
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
museums, not to mention the galleries springing up in Mitte and integration occur—the neighborhood, district, city, metropolis,
other quarters. The Holocaust, the Cold War, they are now occa- state? Is integration always a good thing, or is it really about social
sions for tourism.4 Post-1990 Berlin has also hosted numerous festi- control, reflecting Berlin’s ever-elusive quest for order? Is it some-
vals and international events. The annual Love Parade celebrates the thing that public policy can actively promote? These are the ques-
city’s alternative, techno, and gay scenes.5 The Karnival der Kul- o
tions that guided the authors in this special issue of German P l i t i c s
turen is a multicultural celebration with increasingly diverse musical, and Society.
culinary, and crafts offerings. Although Berlin lost its 2000 bid for
the Olympics, Germany’s sponsorship of the World Cup soccer tour-
nament in the summer of 2006 displayed the delights of B r l i n ’ se Temporal Integration: Inclusive Collective Memory
public life around the globe. The city’s new image has helped make
tourism and the arts into major industries in the city. Healing longstanding conflicts is certainly one understanding of social
Yet, the physical reunification and economic restructuring of the integration, and Berlin is divided in many respects. Key are the city’s
city were not enough to bridge its many social fissures. Bricks and discontinuities across time as well as space. Temporal integration is
mortar alone cannot address real issues of flesh and blood. Berliners what we might call the process of constructing inclusive historical nar-
disagree over the collective narrative of the city’s history. In making ratives. As Maurice Halbwachs argued, the concerns of the present
the city’s new image, some events and groups may be newly com- color what is remembered from the past. Thus, like collective mem-
memorated, but others are in danger of being forgotten. The new ory in general, the construction of urban history is necessarily selec-
construction also entails demolition or at least covering up older tive and exclusive. Yet, human beings cannot remember without
land uses. Berlin, more than many other cities, has changed its social frameworks to help us recollect. For example, collective mem-
image so many times that it is difficult to point to a single unifying ory is sustained through place—the social construction of sacred group
identity among its residents. Although in fact, the place has a partic- landmarks.6 This makes the study of memorials particularly relevant
ular urban culture, social integration in the “New Berlin” depends to the analysis of collective narratives.
upon other factors than the built environment and market image. Berliners disagree, however, about what should and should not be
The city is crisscrossed by sociospatial rifts. In addition to the per- preserved, and the process of constructing a collective narrative is
sisting East/West fracture are splits along lines of nationality, ethnic- controversial. The demand for social inclusion is often a claim for
ity, religion and culture. Overlaying cultural cleavages are class symbolic recognition. Alain Touraine’s theory of historicity identifies
conflicts through which the fortunes of neighborhoods rise and fall. a “symbolic capacity of social actors to construct a system of knowl-
As we shall see, policies to address concentrated urban disadvantage edge and the technical tools that allow them to intervene in their
and programs to integrate the city of Berlin socially have had a own functioning, act upon themselves, and thereby produce soci-
mixed record of success. ety.”7 Meanings arise from conflicts and cooperative social interac-
tions. The state and the ruling class attempt to integrate and order
society with a single set of orientations, while social movements con-
Conceptions of “Integration” test the society’s dominant cultural model using the same historicity.
Scholars of Berlin repeat the fact that there have been at least five
What does the social integration of a city entail? Must it include the “new Berlins” during the 20th century.8 This would seem to preclude
residents’ social interaction, physical proximity, or just a common a singular linear story about the city’s development and identity. The
identification with a place? How important is recognition of one’s “New Berlin” was already marketed as a world-class European city at
own history in coming to feel “at home”? At what scale does social the turn of the last century and in the Golden Twenties, long before
2 3
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
this latest bid for Weltstadt status. The old imperial city, avant-garde Jewish Berlin, Past and Present
Berlin under Weimar, the Nazi plan for Germania, the post-war quar-
tered city, and the Cold War-divided Berlin, one lasting from the con- Sometimes people do not want to remember. They may feel guilty,
struction of the Wall in 1961 through reunification in 1989 - 1990 — e a ch indifferent or even hostile to the group whose history is physically
entailed efforts to remake the city in a new image. part of their everyday environment. They may wish to remove the
This ruptured history and Berlin’s shifting, diverse population cre- symbols commemorating people or events they wish to forget. In
ated “the ultimate postmodern city.”9 From one perspective, what these cases, it may require outsiders—refugees, exiles, the govern-
makes Berlin a distinctive place is its: ment—to insist upon inclusion in the collective memory.
… ever-changing spaces, representations, economies, and political One of the most remarkable aspects of the latest new Berlin is the
systems made and remade by people in the past and present. Berlin is reappearance of visible Jewish life. 14 Before W W I I , there were
a city of multiple modernities, each typified by different desires for 160,000 Jews (4 percent of the population) and ninety synagogues in
the future, including the future-oriented (now hip retro) modernism of
the Weimar period, the romantic and reactionary modernism of Berlin. In the late 1940s, at most 20,000 souls remained. Yet, the
National Socialism, the socialist utopian modernism of the GDR, the Jewish population has quadrupled since the 1980s, thanks to the
Cold War capitalist modernisms of the FRG, and now post-modern immigration of former Soviet Jews. Currently there are officially
neotraditonalism.10
about 12,000 Jews in Berlin, and 100,000 in Germany, two-thirds of
The historical texture of the city’s built environment accrued over whom are from the ex-Soviet Union.15 There are at least eight syna-
the last century’s serial upheavals does tell a story: one of disconti- gogues in Berlin today (108 in Germany). The gold-domed New
nuity. The selectivity of the physical remnants of Berlin also left Synagogue on Oranienburgerstrasse and Daniel Libeskind’s dramat-
voids and emptiness where, as Andreas Huyssen observes, memory ically designed Jewish Museum—with its void to signify the absence
collides with forgetfulness. In Brian Ladd’s powerful metaphor, of Berlin’s doomed Jews—are just two of the centrally located institu-
“Berlin is a haunted city.” In this city of ghosts, “memories often tions that this growing community has restored or established in
cleave to the physical settings of events. That is why buildings and recent years.
places have so many stories to tell. They give form to a city’s his- Berlin’s awareness of Jewish culture is even more pronounced
tory and identity.”11 The wastelands left after the Allied bombing of than this community rebirth suggests. Klezmer music, Jewish come-
WWII, urban renewal, and the Berlin Wall remind us that “Be r l i n - a s - dies, and an Einstein year in 2005, with pithy sayings of the emi-
text remains first and foremost a historical text, marked as much, if grant scientist displayed on banners atop Berlin public buildings,
not more, by absences as by the visible presence of its past.”12 For have fed a “Judeo-philia” in the city as exaggerated as persistent
example, the debate over reconstruction on the land left vacant by antisemitism.16 There are even occasional Muslim-Jewish events in
the Wall was largely a debate over what and whom will be remem- this city. Jewish leaders—Heinz Galinski, Ignatz Bubis, Paul Spiegel—
bered and forgotten in the latest “new” Berlin. Increasingly, though, have made high profile media statements on general issues of toler-
new groups are demanding recognition and inclusion in the history ance, reflecting a new-found moral authority. If the way that elites
of Berlin. East Berliners, new immigrants, homosexuals, and publicly discuss the past—in this case, German treatment of Jews and
minorities protest the neglect of their contributions—and sacrifices— the rise of Nazism—is necessarily selective, Germany’s official contri-
to the city. tion for this history, unlike Austria’s, may have contributed to con-
Noisy, matter-of-fact Berlin, the city of work and the metropolis of temporary German resistance to the rise of the extreme Right,
business, nevertheless has more, rather than less, than some others, of especially in the western part of the country.17 For example, in
those places and moments when it bears witness to the dead, shows November 2000, on the anniversary of the Kristallnacht pogrom and
itself full of dead (Walter Benjamin).13
after a wave of right-wing extremist violence, over 200,000 people
4 5
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
marched from the Oranienburgerstrasse Synagogue to the Branden- a living provocation, as long as power and wealth march on undis-
burg Gate to protest antisemitism and to campaign for tolerance. turbed all around it.”21 The memorial threatened to absolve the
“Struggles in identity politics between Germans and Jews remain country of guilt, others said. It marked a generational turning
tightly linked to a dominant idea of what it means to be German.”18 point.22 Other new commemorative sites—Christian Boltanski’s Miss-
The public debate over the Mahnmal or “warning monument,” as ing House exhibit, for example, or the Topography of Terror exhibit
the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe is called, makes clear at the old Gestapo headquarters site—strive for greater authenticity
that Berlin is the premier site for debating the historical narrative of and public education than the Mahnmal.23 Many Jews rather con-
the German nation. The design, location, and message of the memo- sider the authentic sites of the Holocaust—the concentration camps—
rial were all subjects of conflict.19 as the most appropriate way to remember the crime.24 Paul Spiegel,
Although Berlin had numerous “authentically” sited local memo- president of Germany’s Central Council of Jews, criticized the
rials to the Holocaust and against fascism, the idea of a national memorial as inauthentic, a place for Germans, not for themselves.
monument to the victims of the Holocaust arose in Germany in 1988 The Mahnmal, located on a large and very central plot of land
after TV moderator Lea Rosh and historian Eberhard Jäckel visited within a stone’s throw of the Reichstag, Brandenburg Gate, and Amer-
Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. In 1994, the citizens group, Bundestag, ican Embassy, took on an international significance that transcended
and Berlin government announced a design competition. However, even the national debate over German history. The Holocaust has
when the 1995 jury’s decision—Christine Jackob-Marx’s gargantuan transformed the Jews into the symbol for all sorts of questions about
design—was unpopular, the debate over the Holocaust Memorial led German tolerance of those who are different, yesterday and today.
the Minister of Culture in 1997 to appoint a new commission. These Who belongs to, or is excluded from, an imagined homogeneous, eth-
art historians, architects, and one Jew ( James Young, Professor of nic, Christian society with its own Leitkultur (leading cultural identity).
English and Judaic Studies the University of Massachusetts) invited Shall the persecution of the Roma and Sinti or homosexuals become
design submissions. The jury selected Peter Eisenman’s 2,700 con- part of German history? What about the immigration stories of the 8
crete pillars on 5.5 central city acres. Ground was broken in 1999, million foreigners and 2.6 million Turks in Germany?
and after years of debates and delays, the Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe opened in May 2005. Upon its unveiling, Bundestag
President Thierse remarked that the Mahnmal represents unified Local Memorials
Germany’s “recognition of its own history,” and was designed “not a
kind of negative nostalgia, but rather a remembrance of the victims While national and even international debates over German identity
which obligates us in the present and in the future to a culture of rage, citizens groups have advocated for memorials below the radar
humanity, of recognition, of tolerance in a society, in a country in screen of the mass media. Local groups aim to preserve authentic
which we as a people can be different without fear.”20 This is not a places where historic events actually took place, not dedicate central,
bad definition of social integration. arbitrarily contrived places where tourists and politicians can easily
Nevertheless, this monument did not necessarily promote the assemble to pay their respects. There are Holocaust memorials at
intended social integration. Politicians and the new Jews of Berlin the Wittenbergplatz U-Bahn station and Grunewald S-Bahn station,
were not all in favor of the initiative. Some objected to the abstract on Rosenstrasse for the German wives who protested the arrest of
monumental design with no mention of the identity of the victims or their Jewish husbands, and the moving “Mirror Wall” in Steglitz.
the perpetrators. “It provides one place where the genocide of the Ordinary citizens speak to the neighborhood, not the world.
Jews by the German state can be remembered, leaving all other Jennifer Jordan’s article in this issue offers two examples of the
places free of that responsibility … a final laying to rest, rather than social construction of collective memory at a more local district
6 7
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
level. Whether the memories associated with a place are remem- Memorial initiatives promote social integration in several ways.
bered or forgotten, she argues, largely reflects the intersection of four First, they include former “outsiders” in the collective memory of
forces: land use, property ownership, the resonance of a site’s mean- the city. Just as the Jewish Museum and Holocaust Memorial helped
ing with a larger public, and the presence of an advocate for memo- incorporate one group in Berlin’s history, local memorials integrate
e
rialization. During the years of the German Democratic R p u b l i c other groups into the narrative. There are now attempts to com-
(GDR), the central Eastern Bezirk (borough) of Mitte laid dozens of memorate non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust in more central
memorial plaques, many of which marked resistance to the Nazis. places.25 Second, the process of establishing a memorial entails
Some of these disappeared after 1990, perhaps because their GDR active local participation and enlisting the support of the press, vol-
provenance was evident, but new ones appeared at the initiative of untary associations, and politicians. This builds networks in neigh-
local “memorial entrepreneurs.” The requests clearly reflected a con- borhoods and throughout the city. Third, the “consumers” of
test between those wanting to efface the memory of socialism and symbolic landscapes—the passersby, tourists, and visitors who read
those anxious to preserve it. While the local districts, which govern the plaques and memorial texts or participate in ceremonies in these
the “landscape of memory” through land use rules, have approved spaces—learn who Berliners were and are, and come to identify with
most citizens’ requests for new plaques, land ownership also deter- the city.
mined what is remembered. In some cases, when building owners Nevertheless, there are still many who are forgotten, those long or
objected to a plaque recalling terrible events that happened in their newly excluded from the symbolic community of Berlin. For exam-
houses, citizens insisted on embedding the plaque in the sidewalks in ple, Easterners may want to forget the privileged enclaves of the city
front of the buildings, on public land outside the property lines. where the Stasi and their families lived, such as the Obersee district.
Her second case of local memory-making is the Marzahn ceme- However, many in the Eastern sector of the city feel that the latest
tery, already situated on public land. Here the many layers of mem- incarnation of the “new” Berlin is too western. The exclusion of the
ory and history in Berlin are visible, albeit primarily only to those physical remnants of their lives under socialism is giving rise to what
who live nearby. Many of these were put in place before the Wall some call “Ostalgie.”
fell, but since 1989 the cemetery continues to be an active site of
memorial work. Memorial entrepreneurs or activists, for example,
unveiled a new commemorative tablet (in addition to already extant Spatial Integration
markers) to the Roma and Sinti who were deported from Berlin to
Auschwitz during WWII. Others have created new markers for the Spatial integration means overcoming involuntary segregation and
forced laborers buried in the cemetery, with much of the work being increasing access to places in order to encourage contact and pro-
done by local district residents, but also resonating more broadly in mote solidarity among diverse residents of the city. Social exclusion
dedication ceremonies attended by national and even international is physically inscribed in the organization and control of space.26
o f ficials. This case shows how the site’s meaning resonated with a Through markets, planning legislation, and social practices, cities
broader public, and actively engages local residents in the work of exclude some people from certain places based upon their economic
shaping collective narratives of the past in the urban landscape. resources, political status, cultural practices, regulated behaviors, and
Indeed, the recovery of memory about the treatment of the Roma ascribed characteristics. Four aspects of sociospatial integration are
and Sinti symbolizes contemporary issues in multicultural Be r l i n , discussed in this section: the movement of the united German gov-
especially as Marzahn absorbs new immigrants. “People shape the ernment to Berlin; the reknitting of the East and West of the city; the
memorial landscape,” Jordan concludes, “and the memorial land- rise of multicultural Berlin, a city of immigrants; and class conflicts
scape shapes people.” over space.
8 9
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
A capital is the space that symbolically integrates the social, ethnic, victory in the Cold War, the capital of united Germany should
religious, or political diversity of a country. A capital creates or remain in the West of the country. Berlin was “expensive, militaris-
enhances the national ideology, political values, or common political
beliefs of a state. A capital thus allows disparate social and political tic, Prussian, Stasi, non-European, nationalistic, and eastward-look-
groups to be represented either physically or through participation in ing. And, of course, there was ‘the N-word.’”31
national political bodies and symbols (Andreas Daum).27 In rebuttal, advocates for Berlin argued that the city’s population
was never friendly to the Nazis, especially compared to Munich and
Nuremberg. Indeed, “red Berlin” was diverse and tolerant to out-
Berlin: Capital City siders like immigrants, Jews and homosexuals. Berlin symbolized
resistance to socialist totalitarianism. Practical arguments were also
Capital cities serve nation-states. They are home to national admin- heard. The new democratic countries of Eastern Europe needed a
istrative, economic, and social functions as well as performative, rep- nearby anchor in the European Union (EU). Berlin was not only a
resentative, preservative and informative cultural functions. They cultural center, as befits the German national capital, but also
are places where “power, memory, and culture were set in stone to needed an economic stimulus after subsidies and tax breaks ended
create the impression of a coherent and strong nation,”28 serving as and industry collapsed.
sources of social integration. Capitals also connect a city to a global The June 1991 decision was close. The Bundestag voted 337 to
system of capital cities with similar functions, providing a focus for 320 to move the seat of government to Berlin by 2000, but left eight
both national and international identity. ministries in Bonn. The rebuilding of the Regierungsviertel (govern-
The “new” Berlin is not a new capital city. It was the capital of mental quarter) signified a new start for the capital city and made the
Brandenburg-Prussia since the 15th century and then, in 1871, of reunification of the German state concrete. While normally the
united Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Re i ch Bezirke are responsible for planning, the federal and state govern-
and, after division by the Allies, the GDR. Although the West Ge r- ments took over the process of rebuilding Berlin as a national gov-
man seat of government provisionally moved to little Bonn during ernment center.32
the Cold War, the preamble of the 1949 constitution declared Berlin However, that was not the end of the controversy. In the mid
as the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) o f ficial capital too. In 1990s, faced with high costs, conflicting planning goals and an eco-
1989, many assumed the government would automatically return nomic slowdown, the government center was scaled down. Even so,
there, but Bonn, which had grown into its role, resisted. As a result, debates over the urban plan and architecture, as with the Mahnmal,
debate continued for two years over the movement of united Ger- scarcely concealed broader symbolic struggles. Critics objected to
many’s capital from Bonn to Berlin. any monumental buildings and slammed the “landscape of power”
There was quite a bit of opposition to Berlin, and not only by represented by the “fortress” character of the new government cen-
vested interests and bureaucrats comfortable in Bonn. Not everyone ter.33 There was also a recurring debate over whether, in a democ-
loves Be r l i n . 29 Historically, Frankfurt, site of the first Ge r m a n racy, demonstrations nearby—by the extreme Right or the
National Assembly in 1848-1849, was a serious contender for Ger- Left—could be banned.34 Indeed, back in 1928, Berlin’s Police Com-
many’s capital city. Berlin was profligate, corrupt, and politically missioner did make all “public demonstrations” illegal in an attempt
unstable. The 1991-1992 capital debate was about “the burdens of to master the streets.35 Yet, today, it is hard to argue that the new
the past, about the kind of future Germany wanted, about the way it Berlin will enjoy the same concentration of power as imperial or
would be treated by the rest of the world.”30 Berlin was tainted by its Nazi Berlin. The city is ensconced in a federal state and in an urban
Nazi history, some said, and Germans were still uneasy about system with other cities (e.g., Munich and Hamburg) more economi-
expressing nationalism through a grand capital. Moreover, after cally powerful. Nor is nationalism as resurgent as it was in the 1930s.
10 11
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
Indeed, the city’s current fiscal crisis shows that the rest of the coun- German nation and the normalization of Germany in Europe can be
try is no longer prepared to prop up a city that does not live within accomplished.40 In line with the sociological analysis of boundary for-
its means, capital or not. mation, a reactive, defensive identity arose among Easterners, main-
taining the longstanding divide. As Andreas Glaeser observed:
Overcoming the reality of a political division made the intensive
East and West: Frontier/Crossroads City experience of a cultural division possible. It became apparent to Ger-
mans from East and West that forty years of separate histories, of
increasingly divergent biographic experiences within a set of diverg-
The GDR was legally incorporated into the FRG on 3 October 1990 ing institutions, and participation in fundamentally different dis-
and the entire city of Berlin became a state (Land). The fall of the courses had indeed made a difference. And the Berlin Wall, symbol
Berlin Wall and within a year, its virtual disappearance certainly pro- of the political division of the country, gave way to a discourse on the
vided physical access to places once off-limits, but the “wall in peo- “wall in the heads of people,” a symbol for the experiential division
of Germany.41
ple’s minds” remains. Diversifying access to space is alone
insufficient to guarantee social inclusion. “Ossis” and “Wessis” differ over what should be remembered and
When the Berlin Wall went up in 19 61, it simultaneously forgotten, valued and discredited. Westerners complain about East-
excluded and included.36 As Durkheimian theorists note about social erners’ “Ostalgie” for socialist products and brands and for the
boundaries and classifications more generally, separating groups greater solidarity and security in GDR society. Glaeser explains that
serves to reinforce internal solidarity on both sides. Gradually, the “the debates that go on between east Germans and west Germans
Wall gave rise to mirror-image societies, two sets of identities, prac- about the quality of the GDR, about the preservation or destruction
tices, institutions, and cultures. Each side had its own transportation of monuments from GDR times, about the naming and re-naming of
infrastructure, university, opera, and media. When the Wall fell, streets and squares are all in part a fight over legitimate memories,
knitting institutions together proved easier (although by no means about the way to integrate life experiences into a whole.”42 Similarly,
easy) than socially reuniting the two populations.37 in Huyssen’s words, the “new Berlin” entailed “the politics of willful
Each has developed stereotypes of the other. Westerners intended forgetting: the imposed and often petty renaming of streets in East
to integrate East Berlin into the Federal Republic. East Berlin’s dupli- Berlin … the dismantling of monuments to socialism, the absurd
cate institutions were no longer necessary and hence, disposable. The debate about tearing down the GDR’s Palace of the Republic.”43
capital of the GDR, the showplace of socialism, could be dismantled. Indeed, the debate over the demolition of the Palast der Republik
By 1994, most East German factories closed or were privatized. East- (Palace of the Republic), constructed in 1976 on the site of the bomb-
erners perceived all this as a strategy of “power and humiliation.” damaged baroque Stadtschloss (royal palace) blown up in 1950 by
Westerners fantasized that “Ossis” wanted to join “their” Germany, Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, illus-
the rich, desirable, and powerful West Germany.38 Since unification, trates the different viewpoints about the symbolism of Berlin’s built
West Berliners tended to infantilize Easterners, laying out a blueprint environment. The government closed the Palast shortly after unifica-
for their assimilation to Western values. To illustrate, one notable tion because of the asbestos found throughout the communist build-
urban observer remarked, “the marked xenophobia of the East Ge r- ing, ordering its removal (completed in 2003). Also in 2003, the
man population is an heirloom of the vulgarized black-or-white ideol- government decided to demolish the building, work which began in
ogy of Communism and a result of political immaturity and the 2006 and will be completed by mid 2007. East Germans loved the
injunction of the totalitarian state against independent thought.”39 democratic accessibility of the place, remembering the theaters,
Easterners supposedly have militaristic, bureaucratic, and non-de- restaurants and other amusements there. Until the asbestos removal
Na z i fied behavior that must change before the essential unity of the began, they threw parties, staged theater, and held concerts in the
12 13
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
building. Many favorably compared the Palace with the “trans- Matthais Platzeck notwithstanding), which, in turn, encouraged a
parency” of the new glass dome built over the renovated Reichstag, protest vote for the PDS. The two parts of the city even tend to read
site of the imperial German Parliament and since 1998 the new different newspapers.
home of the Bundestag. For many in the West, however, the Palace In sum, the fall of the Berlin Wall signified the end of the Co l d
is well done away with, symbolizing the empty promises and ques- War, and with it, Berlin’s longstanding significance in geopolitics. In
tionable aesthetics of the communist dictatorship.44 In their view, this “normal” capital city, East and West Berliners could have focused
Eastern nostalgia is being allowed to overwhelm the memory that together on their shared problems of deindustrialization, unemploy-
the “People’s Parliament” had little power in the GDR (in contrast to ment, segregation, and housing and infrastructural deterioration. In
the West German Bundestag) fact, as Kil and Silver’s article in this issue points out, there are unex-
Western stereotypes contribute to resurgent identification with pected commonalities between some east and west Berlin neighbor-
the GDR and the successor to the communist party, the Party of hoods. For example, even before unification, dissidents in eastern
Democratic Socialism ( PDS) in the East. East Berliners resist the Prenzlauer Berg as well as countercultural youth and Turkish immi-
western devaluation of socialist modernism. They remember how grants in western Kreuzberg developed a local “oppositional solidar-
appreciative they were to move out of slums into newly built hous- ity” to state-sponsored “modernist” urban renewal and successfully
ing with modern amenities. Wolfgang Kil and Hilary Silver in this organized to resist the planned demolition of older workers’ hous-
issue describe the continuing appreciation of peripheral high-rise ing.47 However, since unification, the east has lagged behind the west
neighborhoods by some in Marzahn and Hohenschönhausen where in active local participation, partly because high rates of residential
Russian, Vietnamese, and other immigrants have moved as subur- turnover during the last decade mean that neighbors do not know
banizing Germans vacated them. one another, and partly because district administration, which has
Despite many changes since November 1989, the challenge of turned over less, has still not tried to break down the dependency
reuniting the city remains. A 2006 poll of Berliners by TNS EMNID and passivity of eastern residents.48 In many ways, residents on either
found that one out of three West Berliners has no contact with the side of the former dividing line continue to lead different lives.
East. Sixteen years after the end of the GDR, 79 percent of Eastern
Berliners and 68 percent of Westerners disagree with the statement
“I have regular contact with people who live in the West/East of Multicultural City
Berlin.” Moreover, 46 percent say the difference between East and
Germany is a country where there was, is and always will be immigra-
West matters a lot or a little to them. 45 There are few East-West tion. And because this is so, integration is the order of the day. Those
friendships in Berlin because people reduce those on the “other who come to us should not just be here, but also belong here. And
side” to categories. Common citizenship has proven insufficient to they should know and feel that they belong. (President Johannes Rau
encourage shared identity or equal treatment. in 2002)
Differences between the two sides of the city are also politicized. The persistent, historically- and spatially-grounded cultural differ-
The majority of voters in the Western wards support the Christian ence between the eastern and western sectors of the city is not the
Democrats, but a plurality in the Eastern Bezirke opted for the ex- only important cultural cleavage in Berlin. There are also tensions
communist Party of Democratic So c i a l i s m . 46 “ We [We s t e r n e r s ] between Berliners based upon religion, nationality, and class.
preach, punish, ignore, and exclude,” was Richard von Weizsäcker’s Indeed, religious diversification is inscribed on Berlin’s urban
explanation for the Easterners’ political disaffection. The West Ger- landscape. Between 1991 and 2003, while the Jewish community of
man parties did not make sufficient efforts to integrate Easterners the “new” Berlin increased 39 percent, the Muslim community also
into the political elite (Angela Merkl, Wolfgang Thierse, and grew 35 percent.49 Of Berlin’s Muslims, 70 percent are Turks; the
14 15
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
rest come mainly from Bosnia and Lebanon. In 2006, Berlin had Wolfgang Schäuble convened a National Islamic Conference which
about seventy-six mosques in which Friday prayers are recited (there set up four working groups in an attempt to address these issues.
are around 2,500 in Germany). Only three of them are actual Very few Muslims live in East Berlin. Indeed, very few immi-
mosque buildings, however, and the others are located in flats, store- grants of any religion do. Today, about 7.3 million “foreigners” (non-
rooms, industrial buildings, and other facilities.50 Religious tensions German citizens) live in Germany (8.8 percent of the total
spill into the open whenever Muslims propose to build new mosques population) and of those, 1.8 million (26 percent) are Turks.54 In con-
that would allow longstanding congregations to move out of their trast, Berlin’s nearly 450,000 foreigners comprise a higher 13.3 per-
cramped and unattractive quarters.51 Conflicts with their German cent of the city’s than the country’s population.55 Even this is an
neighbors take different forms (NIMBY protests, code violation cita- underestimate since there are 100,000 foreign-born naturalized citi-
tions, zoning regulations, delaying tactics), but usually result in pre- zens in Berlin, and an unknown number of undocumented migrants.
venting the construction of new mosque buildings. Foreigners are unevenly distributed across districts, and different
The need for greater religious co-existence is not confined to Jew- nationalities live in different parts of the city (Table 1). Co n s e-
ish and Muslim relations with Christians. There is also competition quently, the eastern and western sides of the city also have different
among Muslims to serve and represent the faithful. German authori- experiences with non-German immigrants.
ties often complain that divisions among Muslim organizations make
Table 1: Nationality of Registered Foreigners in Berlin
it difficult for the government to find a legitimate Sprachpartner (inter-
locutor) on the Muslim side, allegedly impeding the integration of Number in 2004 Percentage
organized Islam in Germany.52 Mosque building is not the only issue Europe (total) of which: 328,043 72.75
Turkey 118,732 26.33
that calls for negotiation. The clash of German norms with Islamic Poland 35,842 7.95
customs about dress, food, and treatment of women, children, and Vietnam 10,858 2.41
Other Asia 55,560 12.32
animals has posed major obstacles to social integration. Africa 17,443 3.89
In January 2005, Berlin enacted regulations of religious attire— America (North and South) 22,661 5.03
headscarves and other outward symbols—in public employment, Australia and Oceana 1,391 0.31
Stateless/no entry 14,944 3.31
including in schools, courts, and police.53 Religious instruction in the Total Registered Foreigners 450,900
schools, where Muslim Turkish students constitute almost 8 percent, Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2006
has been controversial since 1980. Although Berlin differs from the
Länder in that the government is not obliged to offer religion classes With the construction of the Berlin Wall, labor shortages devel-
at public schools, it now allows religious communities to carry out oped, and both sides recruited migrant workers. The number of for-
instruction directly, based on a curriculum checked by the govern- eigners in Berlin boomed between the 1960s and 1995, but then
ment. The present arrangement dates to 2001, when the Islamic Fed- leveled off. In the early 1960s, West Berlin concluded “guest worker”
eration Berlin, which represents the more conservative Sunnis, and agreements with southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece,
the liberal Muslim Alevi community finally won the right to teach and Yugoslavia) and increasingly, Turkey. In 2004, Berlin had about
Koran and Islamic tradition in the German language in some Berlin 120,000 people with Turkish nationality to which must be added
public schools. Berlin’s position is that there is still no suitable orga- around 50,000 naturalized Turks.
nization to represent the city’s Muslims, and the City Council urged In the west of the city, Turks and other non-German citizens con-
the major Islamic organizations to form a joint association to set up a centrated in the poorer, low-rent districts of Kreuzberg, Wedding,
standard curriculum. In the fall of 2006, Germany’s Interior Minister northern Neukölln and Schöneberg, while affluent districts tend to
16 17
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
be homogeneously German (Table 2). The articles in this issue by ethnic German newcomers from Eastern Europe who moved into
Janice Bockmeyer and by Kil and Silver discuss the Turkish enclave the newly vacant public housing projects at the city’s eastern periph-
that developed in the western district of Kreuzberg. Joined by draft ery.56 Like the Turks, these groups have gone into small business,
evaders and unconventional youth, Kreuzberg residents succeeded especially restaurants and retailing. As in Kreuzberg, multicultural
in halting destructive urban renewal in order to preserve and reno- practices are gradually developing in the far suburbs of East Berlin.
vate older worker housing. In this disfavored neighborhood along Berlin leads Germany in business start-ups, and 14.2 percent of
the Wall, new lifestyles, multicultural creativity, and interethnic tol- the population is self-employed. Breaking this down by nationality,
erance flourished. Today, Kreuzberg, though partially gentrified and 13.8 percent of working Germans in Berlin are self-employed, com-
in other parts poor, is in the center of the united city and has pared to 17.9 percent of immigrants.57 Despite rising self-employ-
become home to a thriving local ethnic economy. ment rates, foreigners have over twice the unemployment rate of
Germans (Table 2). In 2005, 44.2 percent of non-German citizens in
Table 2: Registered Foreigners in Berlin by District, 2004 Berlin versus 19.2 percent of German citizens were unemployed.
Bezirk Number Percentage of Percentage Percentage This gap has grown since 1998, when 33.5 percent of non-Germans
in 2004 Berlin Unemployed Unemployed who were unemployed compared to 16.4 percent of Germans. Berlin dis-
Foreigners are Foreigners tricts with large populations of foreigners are also the districts with
Mitte 88,345 19.59 28.0 35.9
the highest unemployment rates. Foreigners constitute 20 percent of
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 58,425 12.96 23.7 25.8
Pankow 21,388 4.74 15.8 7.0 the unemployed in Berlin as a whole, but in Fr i e d r i ch s h a i n -
Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf 55,777 12.37 21.9 22.4 Kreuzberg, 25.8 percent of the unemployed. They are over a third
Spandau 22,863 5.07 23.8 18.2
of the unemployed in Mitte and Neukölln.
Steglitz-Zehlendorf 29,099 6.45 13.5 16.6
Tempelhof-Schöneberg 50,913 11.29 18.1 24.2 Integration problems confront the second generation as well as
Neukölln 66,034 14.65 24.4 34.5 their immigrant parents. Children of immigrant background are far
Treptow-Köpenick 7,676 1.70 14.1 5.5
more likely to be in the lower division schools and to leave school
Marzahn-Hellersdorf 8,096 1.80 19.7 5.3
Lichtenberg 19,007 4.22 18.9 9.5 without a diploma of some kind. In Berlin schools, 16.5 percent of
Reinickendorf 23,277 5.16 15.4 18.3 the pupils have non-German nationality, but this percentage rises to
Berlin Total 450,900 100.00 19.7 20.1
70 percent in Mitte, Neuölln, and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg schools.
Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin 2006 In 2003-2004, 9.2 percent of German students and 20.5 percent of
non-German students in Berlin dropped out of school without a cer-
The old East Berlin has very few immigrants compared to the tificate. Only 14 percent of Berlin’s non-German origin students,
West. After a temporary agreement with Algeria in the 1960s, the compared to 34.4 percent of German ones, matriculated (with
GDR signed contracts with Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Abitur).58 In 2001, one sixth of foreigners aged sixtenn to twenty
Cuba. By late 1989, over 88,000 foreign contract workers lived in years old had vocational training compared to one-half of young
East Germany, including 59,900 Vietnamese. Most lived in dormito- Germans. Even among those with training, immigrants find it more
ries, isolated from the German population, and after unification, difficult to get a job in the area for which they are qualified. The
became targets of racist violence. As the Kil and Silver article dis- education gap may even be getting worse, suggesting a process of
cusses, most of these contract workers were ultimately repatriated in “segmented assimilation.”59
the years after reunification, but a sizable population of Vietnamese There are very few places in Berlin where foreigners constitute
remains, especially in Marzahn and Lichtenberg. They were joined the majority of the population and in those areas, such as the Kot-
in these eastern districts by a large population of Spätaussiedler, tbusser Tor neighborhood of Kreuzberg, the majority rarely exceeds
18 19
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
60 percent of the population. Nevertheless, ethnic concentration and “first and foremost … the acquisition of the language of the receiving
the spatial concentration of multiple disadvantages have given rise to society,” and only secondarily, a sense of belonging or joining social
German fears of “ghetto” formation. Sociability is ethnically segre- activities and informal networks.
gated. A German social survey reports that less than half of Germans Local initiatives that promote integration in Berlin neighborhoods
have contact with foreigners at work or as friends.60 There is anxiety receive government funds. Almost half of all German Turkish associ-
that parts of Berlin may not feel “German” in the cultural sense. ations promote integration into German society—of the 185 regis-
Thus, in 1998, there was a proposal to forbid non-EU citizens from tered Turkish (non-mosque) organizations in Berlin, many provided
moving into neighborhoods like Kreuzberg with already high per- family services and youth activities.65 For example, one project,
centages of minority residents. Similarly, there were official attempts “Migrant Mothers Learn German,” provides childcare in the same
to keep classes from consisting predominantly of children from place where mothers have language training, making it easier for
migration backgrounds so that the students would learn German. women to leave the home.66 Yet, as Bockmeyer’s article in this issue
These and other policies reflect the German notion that national- demonstrates, small local initiatives like this rarely reach the scale
ity or membership is mainly cultural.61 The 2005 Immigration Law and permanence to foster integration. They may also exclude exist-
earmarked over EURO 200 million to give new immigrants the right ing ethnic organizations from the programs.
to participate in state-funded German language classes and receive On 1 January 2000, a new naturalization law went into effect,
an introduction to the country’s justice system, culture and history. making it easier for long-term residents and their German-born ch i l-
Such courses were previously only offered to Aussiedler. The new law dren to become citizens. As many have observed, Germany is mov-
requires ethnic Germans as well as their family members to pass a ing from a model of hereditary (ius sanguinis) to territorial citizenship
language test before they will be allowed to move to Germany. As a (ius soli) .67 Politicians are slowly recognizing that Germany is a coun-
consequence of this cultural emphasis, multiculturalism in Germany try of immigration. During the 20 02 debate over the immigration
also overemphasizes ethnic, cultural and linguistic factors, transform- law, conservative Bavarian governor Edmund Stoiber declared, “We
ing social problems into ethnic ones, exoticizing minorities, and can’t afford to expand immigration when in terms of integration, we
encouraging reactive ethnicity.62 can’t cope with the existing immigration.”68 Then President Johannes
The emphasis on German language is also seen in official notions Rau took the lead in promoting the integration of immigrants. He
of integration. The Senate of Berlin instituted a Commissioner for launched a competition, “Auf Worte folgen Taten” (Actions Follow
Migration and Integration in 1981, long before the federal govern- Words), to recognize “groups and initiatives in this country that are
ment also got involved when it established the Beauftragte der Bun- helping with integration.” In July 20 06, Maria Boehmer, State Minis-
desregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration. There has ter of the Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, held
long been much concern that over half a million of the 3.4 million an “Integration Summit” for seventy representatives of the 15 million
Berlin residents do not speak German as their native tongue.63 The Germans with “migration background” and government officials at
Berlin Commissioner for Integration and Migration’s Integration all levels. They worked on a national integration plan stressing active
Policy states: “Language skills are the crucial foundation for settling citizenship and centering around four areas: language acquisition;
down in the new society and for integration into the labor market. apprenticeship; labor market integration; and women. Sports, media,
Hence, particular importance is attached in the Senate’s policy to the and other initiatives were also included. The emphasis on language
acquisition of language skills as an essential part of integration.”64 was apparent at the summit. “Integration,” Minister Boehmer argued,
Indeed, when confronted with the immense ethnic gap in educa- “does not happen by itself. It is a process.”69
tional achievement, the commissioner proposed more German lan- At the level of the Land, Berlin’s new integration policy defines
guage instruction. Berlin’s cultural and social integration policy is more precisely what is meant by “integration.”
20 21
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
Generally speaking, integration is the opposite of segregation of exclu- someone of foreign origin, most commonly, a Turk (477/12,569) or
sion ... Integration means that individuals or groups have the equal a Pole (320).75
opportunities to participate in social life and articulate their interests,
as well as being protected from individual or collective exclusion. The To summarize, Berlin is a city divided by numerous cleavages.
creation of equal opportunities is the central element of the integra- Some of these are based upon symbolic or cultural divisions, rein-
tion policy. Integration is absolutely not to be interpreted as adapta- forced by spatial segregation. Yet, the articles in this issue also iden-
tion or assimilation to the existing conditions.70
tify some promising trends towards social integration and
At the same time, cultural factors slip back in. Immigrants and native transcendence of these differences.
Germans must reach agreement on “common integration targets and
core values, which are recognized by all citizens as the foundation for
living together.” These include constitutional principles, such as basic The Political Economy of Contemporary Berlin
rights, democracy, the rule of law and division of powers.
Berlin’s policy acknowledges that integration is a long-term Economic Restructuring
process that demands change not only of immigrants, but of Ge r- After unification, a sense of optimism fed market speculation. Berlin
mans as well. This means combating discrimination. If immigrant aimed to remake itself into a global, capital, tourist city, promoting
neighborhoods like Kreuzberg have been stigmatized as dangerous, its cultural industries and the arts and seducing a few multinational
there are also “no-go areas” in Berlin where neo-Nazis and other corporations to locate their European headquarters there. However,
German hooligans attack foreigners. The number of events of racist the collapse of industry in both the East and West of the city was
violence has been increasing in Germany, especially in the East 1 ,
extremely rapid, and joblessness skyrocketed. From 199 to 2001 the city
where unemployment is very high.71 Even the new construction 50,
shed over1 000manufacturingjobs.Many eastern factories exposed to market
work in central Berlin became occasion for xenophobia, insofar as competition and western factories that had been propped up by spe-
foreign European workers came to Germany to work at below stan- cial subsidies closed. Between 1995 and 2003, the number of firms
dard wages. In early 2007, concerned about a spike in racist crimes, in Berlin with twenty or more employees fell. Growth in service jobs
the Berlin government launched a campaign to combat right-wing was insufficient to make up for these job losses.
extremism. The program, “Youth for Diversity, Tolerance, Democ- Berlin’s unemployment rate rose from 10 percent in 1991 to
racy—Against Right-Wing Extremism, Racism and Anti-Semitism,” almost 18 percent in 2003 and as mentioned above, the latest (Octo-
will fund dozens of local projects to promote cultural diversity.72 ber 2006) official unemployment rate for the Land of Berlin is 19
Germany belatedly passed the EU antidiscrimination directive which percent. In general, the number of unemployed Berliners rose until
should further encourage changes in behavior towards foreigners.73 2003 when it began to stabilize at around 300,000 jobseekers. The
Official policies can encourage integration by developing shared dis- demographic breakdown of the unemployed is also instructive.
courses and enforcing equal treatment and rights. Reflecting deindustrialization, men are more likely to be unem-
In the most general sense, social integration entails the breaking ployed than women, and middle-aged workers under fifty more than
down of boundaries and categories of otherness so that B r l i n e r s
e youth. As mentioned, 42 percent of foreigners are unemployed, over
identify with one another as individuals and feel a sense of “we- twice the average rate of Berliners, and foreigners comprise 20 per-
ness.”74 On the face-to-face level, this can be accomplished through cent of the entire unemployed labor force. Moreover, these figures
performance or acting together, by transgressing the lines between are misleading in that as many as 80,000 unemployed are participat-
public and private to share intimacies and develop trust. One hope- ing in activation programs.76
ful sign of social integration is that in 2004, nearly one in every S u ch dire economic conditions called out for government inter-
four marriages in Berlin was interethnic, between a German and vention to promote economic development. Unfortunately, urban
22 23
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
planning in Berlin frequently provokes quarrels before action. The young and ambitious talent can enable Berlin to leap over bureau-
public sector rarely has the cohesion necessary for effective gover- cratically bound rivals as a center for Internet business and informa-
nance, and land use decisions are separated from the urban design tion exch a n g e . ” 79 The local economy will also benefit from the
process. Thanks to the architectural “expertocracy,” Berlin erupts in consumption patterns of people who enjoy the city’s lifestyle, vari-
c o n flicts over the significance of building designs.77 As a result, the ety, and tolerance and mingle in its galleries, cafes, and institutes of
private sector, especially real estate interests, stepped in to spear- higher learning.
head the recovery of the local economy, leaving the Berlin govern- Despite Berlin’s building boom and its promising media and high
ment to react to development proposals. “Partners for Be r l i n , ” tech industries, economic development remains uneven. The city’s
headed by former Mayor Eberhard Diepgen, launched a “Ne w annual gross domestic product is currently about EURO 80 billion. To
Berlin” marketing campaign in 1998. With corporate financing and put this in perspective, the northern port of Hamburg has roughly
ebullient boosterism, it portrayed Berlin as a capital city, creative the same GDP with only half the population of Berlin. Berlin’s local
city, cultural center, and East-West metropolis. Coupling corporate economy shrunk even when the national economy grew. In sum,
savvy and creative energy, this commercial image disowned older Berlin has not yet become an advanced service center, the conven-
postwar images of division, economic distress, and isolation. Once tional hallmark of a global city.80
Berlin again assumed the status of capital city, leaders hoped to it
the economic hub of the newly capitalist countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. Housing
Adopting a “neo-liberal” policy after unification, the federal gov-
ernment passed a tax subsidy to encourage real estate investment in The city of Berlin has been depopulating. The number of inhabitants
East Germany. The city of Berlin became one large construction site. fell from 3,472,009 in 1994 to 3,395,189 in 20 05. Most Berlin dis-
Speculators and even the city’s own financial corporation (Bankge- tricts lost residents except Fr i e d r i chshain-Kreuzberg, Pa n k o w ,
sellschaft Berlin) drastically overbuilt office space. When expected Reinickendorf, and Treptow-Köpenick. While the population of the
demand shriveled, post-1990 aspirations to make Berlin a fir s t - t i e r state of Brandenburg, which surrounds Berlin, also fell, tens of thou-
postindustrial service-based economy were dashed. Although a sands of mostly middle-class Berlin residents have moved to the
number of corporate headquarters (e.g., Sony) have located in Berlin Brandenburg suburbs in search of single family houses. Young peo-
since the Wall fell, the city has many fewer headquarters, command ple also have left the East for the booming South and West of the
and control functions, and advanced producer services than other country. This selective migration has exacerbated the socioeconomic
large German cities. Within a decade of unification, capitalist goals and ethnic segregation of the city.
still were unrealized. In the mid 1990s, the Land of Berlin, concerned about middle-
Rather, a new industrial base is incubating in this “city of talents.” class suburbanization, developed a master plan, Planwerk Innen-
Small and medium industrial firms are still in town, and Berlin is stadt, to amalgamate the old East and West and to stem the tide out
also becoming home to a cluster of global media, arts, music, and of the central city. To integrate the Western and Eastern commercial
culture industries, as well as software and life sciences research.78 centers, the area around Alexanderplatz in the former East Berlin
Indeed, given the city’s over-building and high vacancy rate, Berlin was especially targeted for reconstruction. The central square was
as a whole has become an affordable large city, one that is attractive redesigned to have a less monumental scale. Luxury condominiums
to well-educated, creative young people, especially from Eastern for the middle classes were built to offer an alternative to single-fam-
Europe. The best hope for Berlin’s future is the new knowledge- ily suburban homeownership. This “top-down” master plan did not
intensive sector that draws upon this human capital: “an influx of solicit public input until it was unveiled. Despite the establishment of
24 25
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
a City Forum to discuss it, experts dominated the discussion, disre- ving this neighborhood change. Some observers positively assess
garding the opinions of ordinary East Berliners. Moreover, conflicts the changes in Prenzlauer Berg and the role of government policy
among politicians, bureaucrats, architects and developers followed. in bringing them about.85 In this case, the government provided
In the end, although the city invested considerable public funds to some funds until recently for “self-help” renovation of older hous-
attract affluent residents, they did not flo ck back to the inner city. ing, so as to avoid displacement and keep middle class residents in
Again, the government overbuilt, leaving tens of thousands of hous- the inner city. Public funds also allowed residents to set up small
ing units vacant. Construction at Alexanderplatz nonetheless contin- businesses and cultural spaces. New buildings were infill projects
ues (albeit at a very slow pace). constructed on vacant lots, so that no one needed to be relocated.
As residents left the center, housing vacancies increased. The While it is true that half of Prenzlauer Berg’s population has turned
oversupply of housing in East German cities is so severe that the fed- over since 1990, high mobility occurred all over Berlin. However,
eral government launched a subsidy program, Stadtumbau Ost, in the trends in residents’ income relative to rent increases are more
20 01 to help cities deal with the over one million vacancies. d i f ficult to evaluate.86
Although oriented to renovating inner city neighborhoods and In sum, Berlin built new unoccupied commercial properties and
retaining their “social mix,” most of the work done under this pro- upscale condominiums in the center, while some of the least desir-
gram so far has been selective demolition of relatively new prefabri- able, peripheral public housing buildings have been demolished.
cated housing high-rises in the urban periphery, carried out by large Overlaying the socioeconomic polarization and ethnic diversifica-
housing companies.81 tion discussed above, the spatial concentration of disadvantage is
It is ironic that demolitions are occurring when there is still increasing. People who have low incomes, are unemployed, and
homelessness in Berlin. The number of homeless people in tempo- dependent on social assistance, including immigrants, live in some,
rary accommodation officially registered with the city of Berlin did though not all of the inner districts of once-industrial West Berlin.87
fall from 10,560 in December 1994 to 6,050 in December 2001 but In contrast, East Berlin has very few immigrants, and some eastern
then rose from 2002 to 2004 by 2.6 percent to 6,850. In addition to districts are even revitalizing. The “new” Berlin appears to be a
the almost 7,000 official registered homeless in the city, there are an polarized, segregated, “multiply divided city.”88
estimated 2,000 to 3,000 more uncounted.82 There is some indica-
tion that Berlin’s local policies toward the homeless are aggravating
their social exclusion by displacing them from central public spaces Fiscal Crisis
and placing services far from areas where they could make a liv-
ing.83 Thus, housing vacancies on the urban perimeter may not solve Traditionally, Germans consider the social welfare state, which allevi-
the social problems of this population. ates class polarization, to be the premier source of social integration.
Yet, by most accounts, the inner eastern districts, especially Pr e n- Just as multiple forms of polarization are developing and the ch a l-
zlauer Berg and Fr i e d r i chshain, are gentrifying. 84 Gentrification lenges of social integration have increased, however, state interven-
entails the transformation of a working-class or lower-income neigh- tion is now declining and welfare benefits cut back.89 Indeed, fis c a l
borhood into a middle-class neighborhood, usually accompanied constraints are even greater in Berlin than elsewhere in Germany.
by renovation of existing housing and involuntary displacement of e
Until 1990, the Federal Republic funded half of West B r l i n ’ s
long-term residents. These older, central neighborhoods of Be r l i n budget, but in the mid 1990s with the end of the Cold War, the spe-
are attracting young, well-educated singles whose consumption pat- cial federal subsidies that kept the urban economy afloat were
terns are stamped on the commercial streets with trendy boutiques, phased out. East Berlin too, after preferential treatment, new housing
cafes and restaurants. Market speculation is not the only force dri- construction, and greater supplies of consumer goods, suffered a
26 27
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
similar loss of subsidies. At the same time, the city faced the tasks of take action in the Constitutional Court to force the federal govern-
unification and the costs of high unemployment, industrial collapse, ment to bail it out. Unfortunately, on 19 October 2006, the court
and the federal government’s devolution of unfunded mandates on ruled that the federal government did not have to help the Berlin
the municipalities. With dwindling revenues and rising expenditures, government pay off its EURO 60 billion debt.93 This means that the
the Berlin government suffered a severe fiscal crisis. city will have to pay the debt on its own by cutting spending and/or
Fr o m unification until 20 01, the Christian De m o c r a t - So c i a l selling off its assets, such as its public housing or the duplicate
Democrat coalition in city government was partly responsible for the operas, zoos, universities, and other facilities inherited from the era
deficit. Bonds floated to invest in East German housing and offices of urban division. By 2007, some Neighborhood Management (see
did not return the expected rents to pay for interest and drove up below) offices have closed.
the city’s debt. In response, the government began cutting back The next section discusses some of the urban programs and activ-
expenditures and subsequently lost power. The 2001 “red-red” coali- ities that Berlin had deployed to address social problems and pro-
tion of Social Democrats and ex-communists [PDS] further slashed mote social integration in the “new” Berlin. As several of the articles
the budget—from public services to social programs, and especially in this issue will argue, programs, like Neighborhood Management,
education, health, police, arts, and recreation—despite citizen might be seen as enforcing social control of the poor more than pro-
protests. The federal government’s 20 03 federalism and Hartz moting their social integration,94 but at least integration was their
reforms did little to help.90 Berlin Mayor Klaus Wowereit and his
ostensible goal.
Finance Minister Thilo Sarazin cut municipal salaries of tens of thou-
sands of city employees, eliminated police jobs, froze new hiring,
increased work hours, ended grants for welfare recipients, reviewed
Social Integration Policies in the New Berlin
social programs, and even privatized traffic lights in the hope of bal-
ancing the budget by 2006.91 In a shortsighted move, some cuts in Soziale Stadt
subsidies to cultural initiatives, higher education and medical centers
After the 1998 federal election of the Social Democratic Party gov-
may undermine the city’s nascent growth industries, making it
impossible to coordinate economic development and social goals.92 ernment led by Gerhard Schröder, urban development policy
Even with these cuts, reducing interest on the debt, constituting underwent a change in orientation from strictly physical develop-
11 percent of the budget, was beyond the administration’s ability. ment to include social objectives. In 1999, the federal and Land
Berlin is spending EURO 2.5 billion a year in interest on its debt, governments jointly adopted the “Districts With Special De v e l o p-
equivalent to EURO 5,000 a minute. In 2006, the city still owes over ment Needs—the Socially Integrative City” program (Soziale Stadt or
EURO 60 billion (U.S. $80 billion) or 70 percent of its GDP, three times Social City, for short). Its goal was to counteract the widening
the average of all other German states. There was little Berlin could sociospatial divisions in German cities by fostering resident partici-
do alone. pation, public-private partnerships, and cooperation among differ-
Most state spending and tax rates are fixed at the federal level. ent levels and agencies of government. The sectoral integration
The Basic Law guarantees that revenues are redistributed according across policy areas aimed to address multiple problems in the same
to a federal equalization scheme to insure equal living standards urban district simultaneously. The program is Germany’s main anti-
across Germany. In 20 02, when the federal government refused to exclusion mech a n i s m .95
help Berlin, the city sued it for emergency funds covering half of Considering the neighborhood as a complex whole, the Soziale
the debt. The Land of Berlin argued that it is in a state of “extreme Stadt aimed to transcend the usual “bricks-and-mortar” approach to
budget emergency,” a legal term that allows a state government to urban renewal typical of the Ministry of Construction. Its substantive
28 29
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
activities encompassed: employment; qualifications and training; ; tial environment. In the East German states, Soziale Stadt has largely
social activities and social infrastructure; schools and education; become a measure supplementing the main “Stadtumbau-Ost” Pro-
health promotion; transport and the environment; urban district cul- gram.98 Thus, the social and participatory aspects of the Social City
ture; sports and recreation; housing market and housing industry; Program are mainly pursued in the West German states. In western
living environment and public space; image improvement and pub- Länder, the districts were more often multicultural, as migrants com-
lic relations; and integration of diverse social and ethnic groups. The posed an average of one quarter of their population.99
integration of diverse social and ethnic groups was a program goal in The Social City Program employed several strategies that, if not
half of the districts too. As in earlier urban development programs, entirely innovative, suggested a change in federal urban policy
however, physical improvement of living environment and public emphases. One key objective was resource pooling across levels of
space was the most frequent activity, found in 81 percent of the dis- government (including the European Union) and between public
tricts.96 Perhaps this is because Germans consider social, economic, and private resources. Another was developing an integrated action
and cultural goals, such as alleviating high unemployment or welfare plan for each district. The third was a new governance regime. It
dependency to be the responsibility of higher levels of government. included the deployment of “Neighborhood Management,” already
In 20 06, 390 urban districts with special development needs in important in Berlin, to implement the program. This Quartiersman-
around 260 German cities and communities participated in the agement (QM ) was supposed to promote horizontal and vertical
Social City Program, although many more urban districts with com- cooperation at the federal, Land, city and district levels, and
parable needs could not yet be included in the program.97 Special between these levels and all other locally relevant players. A fourth
development needs were identified with a number of indicators, goal was the activation and participation of residents and other
both social (high unemployment and welfare dependency) and phys- local organizations.
ical (deficits in housing and modernization and repair backlogs). The Monitoring and evaluation of Soziale Stadt were contracted out.
program targeted high-density, highly populated neighborhoods in After consultation with Land authorities, the Federal Ministry of
urban areas that exhibited problems in terms of social structure, the Transport, Building and Housing delegated information, consulting
condition of the built and natural environment, supply of jobs, level and communication during the initial program implementation
of training, and provision of social and local cultural infrastructure. phase (1999 through 2003) to the German Institute of Urban Affairs
Many of the areas selected, including in Berlin, were already the (DIFU ). Funded by the Federal Office for Building and Regional
focus of earlier targeted urban renewal efforts that were less than Planning, DIFU built a national Social City network; provided on-site
successful. support in sixteen model pilot districts, one per Land; analyzed
The Social City Program is a joint federal-state initiative, as men- good practices; and prepared evaluations of the Social City Program.
tioned, but there are clear differences in the program among the fed- At a May 2002 conference, DIFU presented its initial evaluation of
eral states, especially between the former West and East Germany. the program’s implementation.100 There was a broad consensus that
As Hartmut Häußermann explains in his article in this issue, unem- the program was stabilizing living conditions in disadvantaged
ployment in the Eastern Länder is less of a neighborhood-specific neighborhoods and was building a framework for civic involvement.
problem than a comprehensive and structural regional problem. A similar assessment was found in the Interim Evaluation of the
Moreover, the proportion of foreigners in the region is very low. The Urban Re s e a r ch Institute (IFS) released in 20 04.101 On the basis of
main problem on the urban planning agenda there is the abandon- the 2002 pilot phase assessment, the Berlin Senate extended the pro-
ment and vacancy of housing units, which is why Eastern cities use gram through 2006.102
the resources of the Social City Program primarily to support the A second DIFU survey collected appraisals of municipal govern-
urban reconstruction program and the improvement of the residen- ment officials responsible for implementing the Social City Program
30 31
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
(as of October 2002).103 Responses included widely varying and of all districts with “contingency funds” to allow residents and
even contradictory assessments. For example, the promotion of local groups to accomplish small projects of their choice. This approach
participation is supposed to be central to the program. On the one resembles “citizens’ budgets” in developing country settings. The
hand, DIFU deemed the program to be a resounding success in that Land of Berlin set aside resources from its own budget to set up an
most governments felt the Soziale Stadt helped them to develop Empowerment Fund in the program areas (EURO 500,000 for two
greater rapport with the people in the street. Government respon- years), and a committee of local residents decided on the use of
dents from 90 percent of the districts mentioned “improved chances these resources. Generally, these funds have proven very effective
for residents to participate” as the most important benefit of the pro- instruments for public participation, although any given project was
gram. Administrators in three quarters of the districts also consid- endowed with few resources (often around EURO 10,000). Häußer-
ered the “activation of previously hard-to-activate population mann observes that residents’ committees spend the Empowerment
segments” as successful. Funds very scrupulously and efficiently.
On the other hand, in-depth investigations in the pilot districts In sum, although the Soziale Stadt program granted considerable
cast doubt on the extent to which the task forces, urban district con- discretion for local experimentation, the extent of bottom-up
ferences and forums, planning and future workshops really achieved involvement varied among areas. As for public-private resource
neighborhood involvement, since events tended to attract only the pooling, the second DIFU survey revealed that slightly more than half
middle class. QM uses formal communication and adopts a style that of the districts profited from housing company investment. Business,
excludes less-educated groups that act more informally and sponta- independent, private and foundation interests also contributed
neously. The most excluded groups (migrants and their families, the funds, but less so. However, the fiscal crisis has put the program in
long-term unemployed, senior citizens) who need special attention jeopardy. Häußermann notes that the Social City Program is vulner-
and personal contact on subjects tailored to their current predica- able to shifting city-wide priorities, since fiscally strapped local
ments, were hardly reached. Because organized actors dominated authorities like Berlin must cofinance a share of it.
the neighborhood forum, it was frequently deemed necessary to set Although Häußermann criticizes the Social City Program because
up an additional neighborhood conference through which individual planning for the participating neighborhoods was not integrated into
citizens could voice their opinion. Only in some parts of the pro- city-wide planning, he nonetheless concludes that after its first three
gram areas did local residents actively attend neighborhood con- years, the program “is undoubtedly a great success.” De s p i t e
ferences. The effectiveness of these local residents’ committees unevenness in results, organizational innovations and resident partic-
remained generally much behind that of the organized actors’ com- ipation are steps in the right direction. In contrast, Peter Marcuse’s
mittees. Nevertheless, Berlin was among the few places with effective essay in this issue is highly critical of the Social City Program. He
forms of resident participation in political decision making, Häußer- “raises serious questions as to the actual impact of the program as
mann notes. There, a significant degree of decision-making compe- formulated.” In implementation, the worthy goals of the program
tence was transferred to randomly selected citizens. In fact, one can be subverted and turned into their opposites, and the potential
Berlin community at Boxhagener Platz in Friedrichshain resisted the contradictions among them can be accentuated. Whether the danger
very label of “district with special development needs,” considering of such a dark side to the program are realized or not is significantly
the designation as stigmatizing.104 related to the interpretation of the concepts on which it is based.
The willingness of civil servants and political leaders to delegate Like Häußermann, Marcuse notes that the already insufficient
authority to citizens and local organizations was crucial in encourag- funding for Soziale Stadt has been declining, and is paid for largely
ing activation and participation. For example, one ingredient of suc- at the expense of expenditures in other programs. Thus, it might
cessful neighborhood participation was found in the more than half actually be viewed as a cost-cutting strategy. Cost-sharing and devo-
32 33
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
lution to fiscally strapped states and localities does little to promote groups and immigrants to assimilate and conform to majority
redistribution to areas with special needs. But Marcuse goes further. norms, defusing conflict.
He argues that the program rests upon a “geographical fallacy” that Some of these concerns are also expressed in Bockmeyer’s article
problems are area-wide and that they have causes in the local spatial in this issue.106 She points out that the program’s discourse of “social
environment, rather than the larger economy. Targeting districts inclusion” as civic engagement, participation, and activation promises
with “special development needs” risks equating the problems with more than it delivers. Soziale Stadt emphasizes superficial and limited
the people who live there, rather than with external causes of spa- forms of citizen and immigrant activation within the confined struc-
tially concentrated disadvantage. At the same time, the program ture of the program. Because it emphasizes partnership in the devel-
does not dismantle barriers to Turks and others moving to other, opment of an integrated action plan, it gives more weight to
more prosperous neighborhoods. Housing costs, prejudice, and established social service agencies and diminishes attention to the
inequality more generally account largely for the segregation of poor needs of specific citizens groups. Because it is decentralized, the pro-
minorities. The Social City Program, by taking segregation as given, gram may give immigrants clout within a neighborhood, but impedes
holds excluded populations in place. their inclusion in city-wide politics. The program also sidesteps issues
Soziale Stadt and particularly the Quartiermanagement approach of discrimination and multicultural coexistence.
not only maintain social and economic segregation, but also reduce In the Land of Berlin, fifteen areas participated in the 1999 pilot
the potential for protest and civil disturbance. Berlin has a century- project of “Socially Oriented Urban Development” and two more
long tradition of neighborhood based street protest. 105 The Q M were added in 2001. The socio-spatial strategy of Quartiermanage-
a p p r o a ch includes community policing. Soziale Stadt may also ment was later performed within the framework of the Social City
defuse unrest by making cosmetic improvements in areas of concen- Program. In addition to the QM neighborhoods, Berlin also desig-
trated poverty and by undermining the basis for organized opposi- nated Prevention and Intervention Areas (Verfahrensgebiete) for a total
tion. Coordination among public agencies at different levels and in of thirty-three.
different sectors may in fact conflict with meaningful political par- Of these, Bockmeyer examines the Social City Program in
ticipation of residents. In this view, top-down, efficiency-driven Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, a heavily Turkish-origin neighborhood
Quartiermanagement “manages” poor people, keeping them under long the target of urban renewal efforts.107 Her article focuses on the
control. Participation may not mean empowerment to influence incorporation of Turkish associations into Quartiermanagement
important decisions. In identifying local networks and neighborhood decision making of two districts in the neighborhood, Wrangelkiez
activation as central to urban renewal, the broader public is and Wassertorplatz. The QM staff consisted mainly of professionals of
absolved from responsibility for social exclusion, implying that the German origin who did not live in the area. Although the QM staff
excluded should mobilize social capital to solve their own problems. was charged with identifying and mobilizing pre-existing community
Finally, Marcuse identifies the “dark side” of social inclusion. In organizations to address local needs, they conceived of immigrants
Soziale Stadt, inclusion can also mean dissolution of communities. homogeneously, ignoring important differences among Turks and
For example, the juries that decide on the uses of the “contin- Muslims and neglecting the various organizations representing them.
gency” or “empowerment” funds are drawn from randomly Indeed, the program made various immigrant organizations com-
selected residents, not representatives of local organizations. By- pete against one another, making it harder for them to cooperate.
passing the existing social structure and neighborhood institutions The QM staff often regarded these associations as part of a “parallel
of the self-organized residents, QM aims to co-opt them into larger society” impeding, rather than enabling integration. 10 8 Co n s e-
networks, compromising their autonomy of action. Similarly, an quently, the local Turkish activists were skeptical, distrustful, and
integration program may pressure members of minority ethnic even disdainful of them. The immigrants continued to pursue their
34 35
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
own issues, and for some, Turkish organizations became launching the terms under which the long-term unemployed and social assis-
pads into electoral politics. Similarly, the random selection of resi- tance recipients could receive income support. Whether labeled
dent jurors and the seating of institutions from outside the area in “activation” or “work first,” these new policies expected recipients of
the committee allocating small neighborhood contingency funds led unemployment assistance (ALG II) to engage in productive activities
to the under-representation of the majority-minority Turks. In fact, or face benefit reductions. If recipients could not find a regular job,
the German minority was often awarded “inclusionary” grants over they could still receive a supplement to their benefits of EURO one to
the Turks in order to forestall their outmigration. “Everyone is there, two an hour for working thirty hours a week in the low-wage “sec-
not working together,” Bockmeyer quotes a city official saying. In ond labor market.” The latter naturally included jobs in the non-
sum, the program had little impact on local participation or building profit sector, such as those neighborhood and ethnic associations
of networks among residents in these two sites. The Social City Pro- mobilized to participate in Quartiersmanagement.
gram did not meaningfully bring citizens and immigrants together. Mayer’s article argues that many of the nonprofits supposedly
enlisted by Berlin and other governments to integrate the unem-
ployed into the labor market are doing so on less than desirable
Labor Market Integration Policies terms. Increasingly, social integration into a decent job with a living
wage is taking a back seat to social control and management of the
The role of nonprofit and immigrant associations in the Soziale Stadt potentially explosive unemployed. Although civil society, social capi-
program underlines their increasing importance in the German wel- tal, social economy, and other buzzwords of the “third sector” are
fare state more generally. In the fiscally strapped city of Berlin, it is receiving unprecedented attention in urban and social policy, non-
not surprising that government is relying upon civil society to absorb profits are not necessarily liberating, innovative, or responsive to
cutbacks in public funds. This is the subject of Margit Mayer’s article their clients’ needs. Of the 1, 200 nonprofits in Berlin, Mayer notes, at
in this issue. least 100 engage exclusively in local employment programs, and of
European integration, global economic competition, and unifica- those, twenty are active in the fields of cleanliness and public order.109
tion have all placed the German welfare state under increasing fiscal These activities can hardly be said to promote social integration.
pressure. Deindustrialization, investment in urban development, and Mayer distinguishes among “good,” “bad” and “ambivalent” non-
the end of special federal subsidies to the city also contributed to ris- profit employment practices. Her criteria for “good practice” include
ing unemployment and overburdened social services in Berlin. In participatory “bottom up” economic development under neighbor-
the early 1990s, Germany passed legislation to help the Eastern Län- hood control without “releasing the (local) state of its responsibility
der cope with structural adjustment. Wage subsidies (ABM, SAM) pro- for the social infrastructure.” Good nonprofits prepare residents for
vided incentives to retain employees displaced in the upheaval of jobs with a future at decent wages. Some secondary labor market
the socialist economy. Nonprofit associations also made use of these jobs, however, are “dead ends”—they do not lead to better working
subsidies to hire workers temporarily and train them, while accom- conditions and wages. The problematic social implications make
plishing socially useful goals that would not compete with private these practices “ambivalent.” However, Mayer criticizes the “bad”
market activities. practices of nonprofits, often enlisted in QM initiatives. These place
By the turn of the 21st century, however, ABM and similar pro- welfare recipients in repressive, exclusionary, and stigmatized jobs at
grams were cut back. The right to unemployment insurance after less than minimum wages and offer no training or diploma. Exam-
participating in these programs for a year was rescinded. The ples include projects to clean and police public spaces, “forcing the
Schröder government acquiesced to EU and business support for poor to combat the poor,” as Volker Eick puts it.110 To be sure, the
welfare state reform. The Hartz laws, especially Hartz IV, changed associations participate in these activities because of the rules and
36 37
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
restrictions of public policies. Nonprofits cannot pay more because protesters who express the fear and despair of joblessness. Talk of
they are legally forbidden from engaging in market activities to social integration may simply distract public attention from the
cross-subsidize their social activities. They have become local state causes of mass unemployment and government impotence to
agencies, executing workfare programs and dependent on public address it. Integration programs like Soziale Stadt, at best slow the
finance. In sum, there is considerable variation among nonprofits in downward spiral of urban deterioration and unrest, offering a band-
their promotion of social and labor market integration. aid instead of viable solutions.
Integration usually implies that the pieces should fit together har-
moniously, precluding conflict. This means adaptation of all the
Conclusion pieces, the majority and the minorities. Such integration can arise
through the pursuit of common goals and coming to grips with the
The articles in this issue all address aspects of social exclusion and past. Although aesthetics distract attention from material issues, sym-
integration in the “new” post-1990 Berlin. As discussed above, the bolic debates can result in a unified vision, a collective identity, and
physical unification of the city has proceeded more successfully than a consensual inclusive memory of events and people who shared a
building its social cohesion. Berlin’s myriad schisms and inequalities given space. Yet, Berlin is still divided in these respects, too:
overlap in complex ways. Nevertheless, this city, like many Euro-
There is a troubling “schizophrenia” of boomtown and recession, a
pean cities and unlike most in the U.S.A., tries to do something about l a ck of clear planning vision to coordinate and regulate the 1990s
them.111 Unfortunately, the social integration that many Berliners building boom, greater tolerance of rich-poor disparities, intolerance
seek remains outside their grasp. To use Glaeser’s phrase, Berliners of immigrants, a rising interest in right-wing politics, and enduring
resentment and inequality between east and west. In other words,
remain “divided in unity.” Berlin is becoming a western capital city like many others. 114
Integration is not necessarily the opposite of exclusion. Integra-
tion usually implies more than nominal membership, more than Recognizing this “urban Euro-convergence” calls attention to the
interaction and shared experiences in a vibrant public sphere, more social integration of, not only in, the “new Berlin.” In terms of the
than equal rights, more even than friendships and intermarriages. German urban hierarchy, the country’s decentralized federalism will
When German authorities speak of integration, they are usually impede the preeminence of Berlin, even as the capital at the apex of
referring to assimilation of foreigners. Newcomers are expected to the national system of cities. With the end of the Cold War and the
adopt the German language, German norms, sometimes even Ger- expansion of the European Union eastward, Berlin is becoming bet-
man dress and appearance.112 The evolution of multiculturalism in ter integrated into the larger Continent’s city-system. As Berlin looks
the city—itself a different form of social integration—will disappoint westward, towards the older EU member states, it enters regional,
them. Neighborhood, religious and ethnic institutions are agents and indeed global market competition. As it looks eastward from the
venues to knit Berliners together, not only keep them apart. They frontier of the former socialist world, it beckons with freedom, multi-
deserve adequate support for activities that support public goals. culturalism, and just a bit of democratic chaos. Berlin represents the
Integration may also connote social control and imposed order. possibility of a peaceful transition to national and European unifica-
This can occur through violence and disciplining institutions as well tion and the need to fight continuously against the threat of intoler-
as through socialization by schools, the media, and intercultural con- ance and authoritarianism. Integration into a larger social system
tacts. Common participation in collective action—demonstrations, may give rise to nostalgia for the older, insular Berlin, the “welfare-
strikes, and festivals—can build solidarity across conventional social dependent” city where consumption and culture took precedence
categories, as well as threaten social peace.113 In Berlin, the local over industry, but the pressing internal challenges of social integra-
state must discipline both the right-wing extremists and left-wing tion will force Berlin out of its parochialism.
38 39
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
Many of the articles in this issue discuss what government policy excluded American and socialist modernism. They deployed this model to
oppose homogenizing globalization and privately driven real-estate develop-
can do to promote social integration in the “new” Berlin. In addition
ment as well as “uncivilized” East German architecture of an inhuman scale. The
to the persisting East/West fracture, there are splits along lines of paradigm called for older 19th century design—an historical street network, lim-
nationality, ethnicity, religion, and culture. Overlaying cultural ited building heights, a traditional urban layout, mixed-use functions, limestone
cleavages are class conflicts through which the fortunes of neighbor- façades, building materials from the commercial architecture of the 1900s, and
the “Prussian Style.” In contrast to the segregated, automobile oriented city, the
hoods rise and fall. Policies to address concentrated urban disadvan- ideal European city emphasized social integration, high density, public urban
tage and programs promoting social integration have had a mixed planning, public transportation, and “urbanity,” public space, and café life. See
record of success. The Social City Program did not promote much o
Virag Molnar, “Post-War Berlin: Reclaiming the ‘European City,’” C nference
Paper at the American Sociological Association, 2004 Annual Meeting, San
integration of immigrants and their own associations into the larger Francisco, 1-20. On the importance of international architects, see Elizabeth
city. Labor market integration programs have left too many people Strom, Building the New Berlin: The Politics of Urban Development in Germany’s Capi -
unemployed when they end. Nevertheless, social integration is a tal City (Lanham, 2001).
3. aren E. Till, The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis, 2005), 5.
slow process of adaptation, struggles for acceptance, and broadening
4. Institutionalizing the Holocaust has its dangers of becoming just a part of “her-
horizons. Berlin surely offers an instructive vantage point from itage tourism,” even if that is the price of future generations remembering the
which to observe these endeavors. event. See Anson Rabinbach, “From Explosion to Erosion: Holocaust Memorial-
ization in America since Bitburg,” History and Memory 9, no. 2 (1997): 238-43.
5. The Love Parade, which takes place in the central Tiergarten, began fifteen
H ILARY SILVER is Associate Professor of Sociology and Urban Stud- years ago, but it was cancelled in 2004 and 2005 after the organizers failed to
ies at Brown University and an Affiliate of the Center for European find private sponsors to pay for clean up. When new organizers found the funds
Studies, Harvard University. This special issue is based upon a 2005 for summer 2006, the parade was reinstated.
6. Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York, 1980).
conference she organized with grants from the Deutscher Akademis- 7. Alain Touraine, The Self-Production of Society (Chicago, 1977).
cher Austausch Dienst (DAAD) and Brown University’s Wayland Col- 8. Barbara Be ck e r -Cantarino, “Reflections on a Changing Berlin,” in Berlin in
legium. In 2006, she participated in the Fulbright program on Focus: Cultural Transformations in Germany, ed., Barbara Becker-Cantarino (West-
port, 1996), 1-34; Till (see note 3); Andreas Huyssen, “The Voids of Berlin.”
Muslim minorities in Germany and France, and with research sup-
Critical Inquiry 24 (1997): 57-81.
port from the DAAD, studied local integration efforts in two neighbor- 9. John Borneman, Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation (Cambridge,
hoods of Berlin. 1992).
10. Till (see note 3), 50-51.
11. Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape
(Chicago, 1997).
12. Huyssen (see note 7), 60.
13. Walter Benjamin, “A Berlin Chronicle,” in Reflections (New York, 1986), 28.
14. For more on Berlin’s Jewish community, see Y. Michal Bodemann, “Staat und
Ethnizitaet,” in Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945 (Frankfurt/Main, 1986) and
Andrew Roth and Michael Frajman, Jewish Berlin (Berlin, 1998).
Notes 15. Jeffrey Peck, Being Jewish in the New Germany (New Brunswick, 2006), 6-9. About
75 percent of Berlin’s Jews originated in the Soviet Union, and most but not all
1. This special issue is based upon a conference held at the Watson Institute for arrived after 1990. However, as many as 120,000 Russian Jews in Germany have
International Studies at Brown University on 14 March 2005. The author grate- not registered as such, so these figures are underestimates. Personal interview
fully acknowledges the financial support for this project of the German Acade- with Stephan Kramer, General Secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Ger-
mic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Brown University Wayland Collegium, many, October 2006. He estimates that 70 percent of Russian Jews are receiving
as well as the assistance of Mary Horning, Adam Goldman and Eric Langen- social assistance so they do not have to pay religious taxes, which requires a dec-
bacher. laration of community membership. Some estimate the German Jewish popula-
2. M u ch of the debate is over traditional versus international modernist styles. tion at 150,000 because, according to the Bundesverwaltungsamt, that is the
Berlin professionals constructed a paradigm of the “European city” that number of “quota refugees” from the ex-USSR joined the 28,000 German Jews
40 41
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
counted earlier. The quota refugees include non-Jewish spouses. See Jonathan 29. Even Wilhelm von Humboldt considered Berlin “intellectually bankrupt” and
Laurence, “(Re)constructing Community in Berlin,” German Politics and Society “unliterary.”
19, no. 2 (2001): 22. 30. Alexandra Richie, Faust’s Metropolis: A History of Berlin (New York, 1998), 851.
16. One of the ironies of this German openness to Jewish culture is that Klezmer 31. Kenneth Bowling and Ulrike Gerhard, “Siting Federal Capitals: The American
had little popularity among German Jews before the war. It was, and largely still and German Debates,” in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 45.
is, wedding music for Eastern European Jews. 32. Strom (see note 2).
17. David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge, 2006). 33. Marcuse (see note 19).
18. Peck (see note 14), 16. 34. Instead of a total security cordon (B a n n m e i l e), regulations for a “pacified area”
19. For a history of the Mahnmal debate, see Janet Ward, “Holocaust Architecture (befriedeter Bezirk) were enacted in 1999. They allow the police to ban extremist
in Washington and Berlin,” in Berlin-Washington, 1800-2000, eds., Andrea Daum e
demonstrations that might disturb the business of Parliament. D monstrations
and Christof Mauch (Cambridge, 2005),155-200. After the first design competi- do take place near the Brandenburg Gate, and some have been permitted
tion failed, a second one awarded the prize to Peter Eisenman in 1997. Faced around the Bundestag and Bundesrat. In 2003, the Bundestag found that this
with its huge size and monumental character, there was also a scholarly debate system of allowing demonstrations as long as there are no parliament assemblies
over whether to build it in the first place. See Roger Cohen’s statement in the worked. But, when elements from the neo-Nazi movement began to hold
New York Times (19 January 2000) to that effect, cited in Ward, 170. It was unclear demonstrations near historic sites, a new chapter was introduced into the Law of
whether art in any form could represent the enormity of the Holocaust, but once Assembly (Versammlungsgesetz) permitting the refusal of demonstrations aimed at
the proposal was raised, it would have been difficult not to build a memorial antifascists where the dignity of victims might be derogated. In Berlin, this
without implying that Germans just wanted to forget the past entirely. Hartmut means the Holocaust memorial. I am grateful to Volker Eick for this information.
Häußermann, “Economic and Political Power in the New Berlin: A Response to 35. Belinda Davis, “’Everyday’ Protest and the Culture of Conflict in Berlin, 1830-
Peter Marcuse,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 (1999): 1980,” in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 275.
180-84. 36. Ernst Schuerer, Manfred Keune, and Phillip Jenkins, eds., The Berlin Wall: Repre -
20. The memorial began as an idea presented by journalist Lea Rosh in 1988 in the sentations and Perspectives (New York, 1996).
journal “Forwards.” The Week in German y, 13 May 2 0 0 5 ; . h t t p : / /w w w. 37. Mike Dennis and Eva Kolinsky, eds. United and Divided: Germany since 1990
germany.info/relaunch/info/publications/week/2005/ 050513/politics1.html. (New York, 2004).
21. Peter Marcuse, “Reflections of Berlin: The Meaning of Construction and the 38. Borneman (see note 8).
Construction of Meaning.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 22 39. Häußermann (see note 18), 183.
(1998): 336. 40. Andreas Glaeser, Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Po l i c e
22. Scott Campbell, “Capital Reconstruction and Capital Accumulation in Berlin: A (Chicago, 2000).
Reply to Peter Marcuse,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23 41. Ibid., 324.
(1999): 173-79. 42. Ibid., 333-4. See also Dirk Verheyen, “What’s in a Name? Street Name Politics
23. John Czaplicka, “History, Aesthetics, and Contemporary Commemorative Prac- and Urban Identity in Berlin,” German Politics and Society 15, no. 3 (1997): 44-55.
tice in Berlin,” New German Critique 65 (1995): 155-87. 43. Huyssen (see note 7), 60.
24. Paul Spiegel, president of Germany’s Central Council of Jews, like “many Jews 44. Häußermann (see note 18).
around the world have said that the memorial is for Germans and not for them, 45. “ Jeder dritte We s t - Berliner ohne Kontakt in den Osten,” Berliner Morgenpost, 1
since the places of Jewish remembrance are at the scenes of the crime them- October 2006. More generally, almost half of West Germans, and especially
selves, at the concentration camps where they ‘still feel most close to the vic- younger people, have not visited the east in the sixteen years since unification,
tims,’” The Week in Germany, 13 May 20 05; http://w w w. g e r m a n y. i n f o / according to a TNS EMNID poll, but only 12 percent of East Germans have not
r e l a u n ch/info/ publications/week/2005/050513 / p o l i t i c s 1.html. Indeed, Libe- visited the West. See “Half of West Germans Haven’t Visited East: Divided Ger-
skind himself asserted that the best thing for Berlin would be to invest less in a many,” Spiegel Online, 28 December 2006, available at http://www.spiegel.de/
separate “artificial” Holocaust monument than in maintaining Ravensbrück and international/0,1518,456865,00.html.
Sachsenhausen. Ward (see note 20), 197. 46. Margit Mayer, New Lines of Division in the New Berlin,” in Towards a New Met -
25. M i chael Z. Wise, Capital Dilemma: Germany’s Search for a New Arch i t e c t u re of ropolitanism: Reconstituting Public Culture, Urban Citizenship, and the Multicultura l
Democracy (New York, 1998). Imaginary in New York City and Berlin, eds., Friedrich Ulfers, Gunter Lenz, and
26. Ali Mandanipour, Goran Cars, and Judith Allen, eds., Social Exclusion in Euro - Antje Dallman (London, 2004).
pean Cities: Processes, Experiences, and Responses (London, 1998). 47. Wolfgang Kil and Hilary Silver, this issue; Wolfgang Kil, “Transitstation Ho f f-
27. Andreas Daum, “Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the nung: Ein Stadtteil für Einsteiger, Aufsteiger, Aussteiger,” in Prenzlauer Berg: Ein
Nation,” in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 13-14. Bezirk zwischen Legende und Alltag ( Berlin, 1996), 19 - 28; Brian Ladd, “Local
28. Andreas Daum, “Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the Responses in Berlin to Urban Decay and the Demise of the German Democratic
Nation,” in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 17.
42 43
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
Republic,” in Composing Urban History and the Constitution of Civic Identities, ed. second-generation immigrants (children with at least one parent born outside the
John Czaplicka and Blair Ruble (Washington/Baltimore, 2003). country) and Germany ranked at the bottom of the seventeen countries on this
48. Christiane Droste and Thomas Knorr-Siedow. “The German Housing and indicator. It implies things are getting worse. Language and the geographical ori-
Urban Policy Environment for Local Initiatives,” in Housing Policy and Social gin of immigrant children cannot explain national variations in performance.
E x c l u s i o n, ed. Zoltan Kovacs (Bergen 2001), available at http://www.nhh.no/ Even if immigrant students with families from Turkey tend to perform poorly in
g e o / N E HOM / p u b l i c a t i o n s / N E HOM _ D 2 . p d f # s e a r ch = p e r c e n t 22 s o c i a l many countries, they do significantly worse in Germany than they do in Switzer-
percent20 exclusion percent22. land. On segmented assimilation, see Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The
49. Hartmut Häußermann, “Unkämpfte Symbole: Mo s cheen in der Christlich e n New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants,” Annals of the
Stadt—ein Einwurf,” in Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Berlin, ed., Riem Spielhaus American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 530 (1993): 74-96.
and Alexa Farber (Berlin, 2006), 85-87. Today, there are some 3.5 million Mus- 60. Statistisches Bundesamt, Datenreport 2003 (Bonn, 2004).
lims in Germany. 61. Ayse Caglar, “Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalisation of Spaces in
50. Spielhaus and Farber (see note 44). In addition, Berlin has two Alevi and three Berlin,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 27, no. 4 (2001): 601-13. Commis-
Sufi prayer rooms that deliver no Friday prayer. Others count as many as eighty- sioner for Integration and Migration (See note 56), 20.
two prayer rooms in Berlin. Gerdien Jonker, “The Mevlana Mosque in Berlin- 62. Frank-Olaf Radtke, “The Formation of Ethnic Minorities and the Transforma-
Kreuzberg: An Unsolved Conflict,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. tion of Social into Ethnic Conflicts in a so-called Multicultural Society—the Case
6 (2005): 1079. See also Roger Cohen, “Berlin Ends Islam Dispute,” International of Germany,” in Ethnic Mobilization in a Multicultural Europe, ed. John Rex and
Herald Tribune, 7-8 November 1998. Beatrice Drury (Avebury, 1994).
51. Jonker, (see note 45); Ulrich Bahr, “Mo s cheebau in Kreuzberg,” in Spielhaus 63. The International Organization for Migration,“The Challenge of Integrating
and Farber (see note 44), 80-84. Migrants into Host Societies—A Case Study from Berlin,” in World Migra t i o n
52. In Germany, there is no official representative. Rather, several groups claim to 2003: Managing Migration—Challenges and Responses for People on the Move, Chapter
represent Muslim interests nationally: the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik 4 (Geneva, 2003).
Deutschland, which is dominated by the Turkish Islamist group Milli Göru˝s, the 64. Commissioner for Integration and Migration (see note 56), 8.
e
Zentralrat für die Muslime in D u t s chland, the small Föderation der Aleviten 65. N. Oegelman, “Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Poli-
Gemeinden in Deutsschland, and the Diyanet, which is associated with the Turk- tics among Germany’s Turks,” Internationa l Migration Review 37, no. 1 (2003):
ish government. The Turkisch-Islamische Union manages nonprofit associations. 163-92; M. Greve and T. Cinar, Das Tuerkische Berlin (Berlin,1998).
For more on the relationship of Islam and the German State, see Jonathan Lau- 66. The International Organization for Migration (see note 53).
rence and Justin Vaïsse, Integrating Islam (Washington, 2006). 67. On the history of these notions of citizenship, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship
53. Steven Pfaff and Anthony Gill, “Will a Million Muslims March? Muslim Interest and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, 1992). On the significance of
Organizations and Political Integration in Europe,” Comparative Political Studies the 1999 naturalization reform, see Antoine Pécoud, “‘Weltoffenheit schafft
39, no. 7 (2006): 803-28. Jobs:’ Turkish entrepreneurship and multiculturalism in Berlin,” International
54. Facts about Germany 2006 at http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 26, no. 3 (2002): 494-507, and Caglar (see
/inhaltsseiten-home/zahlen-fakten/bevoelkerung.html. note 52). Perhaps ironically, since 2000, the number of formal naturalizations in
55. For the most current statistics, see Beauftragte für Integration und Migration of Berlin fell from about 12,000 to about 6,000 a year because citizenship is auto-
the Land of Berlin. matically granted to those born in Germany and they need not naturalize.
56. From 1991 to 2005, about 49,000 “repatriates” were distributed to Berlin and 68. B BC News Online, 22 March, 20 02; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ h i /w o r l d /
registered in the State. Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Sen- europe/1886897.stm.
ate of Berlin, ed. Encouraging Diversity— Strengthening Cohesion: Integration Policy in 69. As presented at the Bundespressekonferenz attended by Hilary Silver, 5 July
Berlin (Berlin, 2006), 12. 2006.
57. According to the OECD’s Urban Renaissance Study: Berlin, ibid. 70. Commissioner for Integration and Migration (see note 56), 20.
58. Ibid., 25. In Germany as a whole, 47 percent of the foreign-born have less than a 71. European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (see note 52).
secondary education and fewer than 15 percent have a higher degree. European 72. “Battling the Right: New German Program against Neo-Nazis,” Spiegel Online 9
Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Germany (Stras- January 2007.
bourg, 2004). 73. In April 2005, the European Court of Justice ruled that Germany had breached
59. The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tested fif- EU law by failing to pass national legislation in line with a 2000 European
teen year-old students in forty-one countries in mathematics, reading compre- Directive prohibiting discrimination—in employment, vocational training, educa-
hension, science and problem-solving skills in 2000 and 2003. When compared tion, social security and healthcare, access to goods and services and housing—on
to native German students, first-generation immigrants (born outside of Ge r- the basis of race or ethnic origin. The directive also requires member states to
many) perform well below the average of first-generation immigrants in the sev- create an institution to promote equal treatment and support to victims of racial
enteen countries participating. But the gap becomes even larger among discrimination. The deadline for EU member states was 19 July 2003, but con-
44 45
Hilary Silver Social Integration in the “New” Berlin
servative parties especially blocked the legislation sponsored by the Greens. In 86. Brenner (see note 70).
August 2006, Germany passed a General Law on Equal Treatment ( [AGG]) on 87. Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung, The Berlin Housing Market: Summary,
the basis of race, ethnic origin, sex, religion or creed (Weltanschauung), sexual Report 2005 ( Berlin, 20 05); Kraetke, (see note 65); see also Kraetke and Borst
orientation, disability/handicap, or age. (see note 65) and Häußermann and Kapphan (see note 67).
74. Glaeser (see note 35). 88. The term “multiply-divided city” is more precise than the term “dual city” that
75. Beauftragte für Migration und Integration Berlin. has been used to describe similar patterns. See John Mollenkopf and Manuel
76. Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Regionaldirektion Berlin-Brandenburg, May 2006. Castells, Dual City: Restructuring New York (New York, 1991).
Activation measures include occupational training (9587), ABM or Arbeitsbeschaf - 89. For example, see Häußermann and Kapphan (see note 67).
fungsmassnahmen (9413), and SAM or Sturkturanpassungsmassnahmen (225) or Work 90. “Germany’s Federalism and Finances: Municipal Mayhem,” The Economist, 16
opportunities through the newly restructured unemployment assistance (Parag. August 2003, 45. The plan called for extending corporate income tax to self-
16 Abs. 3 of SGB II) (39 , 551). For more detail, see http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/ employed professionals, making the trade tax municipal, increasing the local
RD-BB/RD-BB/A01-Allgemein-Info/Publikation/pdf/Aktueller-Monatsbericht- share of sales tax, federally funding child care centers, and federal assuming of a
10 02.pdf. The definition of unemployment differs between the German Social merged unemployment assistance and social assistance benefit program.
Code (SGB) definition and the International Labour Association joblessness con- 91. “Germany’s Capital: Nearly Bust,” The Economist, 19 July 2003, 39.
cept; with the former, unemployment was 7.3 percent versus the latter at 9.6 per- 92. Kraetke (see note 65).
cent in October 2006 (and 10.4 percent, seasonally adjusted). 93. “Berlin’s Finances: Painful Relief,” The Economist, 29 April 2006, 56. In 1992, the
77. Strom (see note 2). Constitutional Court ruled that Bremen and Saarland also had to pay their debts
78. Stefan Kraetke, “City of Talents? Berlin’s Regional Economy, Socio-Spatial Fab- when they asked for bail-outs. The court’s ruling means that Germany will be
ric and “Worst Practice’ Urban Governance,” International Journal of Urban and able to meet its own debt limit set by the European Union Maastricht Treaty. For
Regional Research 28, no. 3 (2004): 511-29. Stefan Kraetke and Renate Borst, the first time since 2002, Germany will have a budget deficit of 2.6 percent of
Berlin: Metropole zwichen Boom und Krise (Opladen, 2000). GDP in 2006, under the 3 percent threshold.
79. Carl Abbott, “Washington and Berlin:National Capitals in a Networked World,” 94. On this point, see Brenner (see note 70).
in Daum and Mauch (see note 19), 123. 95. Strategies to Enhance Social Integration: National Action Plan against Poverty
80. Elizabeth Strom and Margit Mayer, “The New Berlin,” German Society and and Social Exclusion, 2003-05.
Politics, 16 (1998); Abbott, (see note 81), 101-24. e
96. D u t s ches Institut für Urbanistik (DIFU), Soziale Stadt—Strategien für die Soziale
81. Birgit Glock and Hartmut Häußermann, “New Trends in Urban Development Stadt, Erfahrungen und Perspektiven—Umsetzung des Bund-L ä n d e r -Programms “Stadt -
and Public Policy in Eastern Germany: Dealing with the Vacant Housing Prob- teile mit besonderem Entwicklungsbedarf – die soziale Stadt,“ 2003. The population of
lem at the Local Level,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28, no. this survey—222 districts—is 90 percent of all areas supported by the 1999, 2000
4 (2004): 919-29; and Hartmut Häußermann and Andreas Kapphan, Berlin: von and 2001 programs.
der geteilten zur gespaltenen Stadt? Sozialra e u m l i cher Wandel seit 1990 (Opladen, 97. http://www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de/programm-soziale-stadt/ See also,
2000). Heidede Be cker, Stephanie Bock, Crista Boehme, and Thomas Franke, Dritte
82. There are no precise national statistics on the homeless, insofar as municipalities bundesweite Befragung in den Programmgebieten der ‘Sozialen Stadt:’ Zentrale Ergebnisse
are responsible for this population, but estimates do exist. In Germany as a und Empfehlungen (Berlin, 2006).
whole, homelessness has been declining (especially among multiperson house- 98. Hartmut Häußermann in this issue.
holds and Aussiedler) since 1995. The most recent (2004) estimate of homeless- 99. Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik (see note 82), footnote 2.
ness in Germany is 310,000 to 380,000 (BAG Wohnungslosenhilfe e.V., February 100. Heidede Becker, Thomas Franke, Rolf-Peter Löhr and Verena Rösner, “Socially
2006). For figures on Berlin, see http://www.strassenfeger-berlin.de/ and http:// Integrative City Programme—An Encouraging Three-Year Appraisal,” (Berlin,
www.feantsa.org/code/en/pg.asp? Page=24&pk_id_news=238. 2002).
83. Jurgen von Mahs, “The Sociospatial Exclusion of Single Homeless People in 101. Institut für Stadtforschung und Strukturentwicklung (IFS). Die Soziale Stadt:
Berlin and Los Angeles,” American Behavioral Scientist 48, no. 8 (2005): 928-60. Ergebnisse der Zwischenevaluation. Bewertung des Bund-Lander-Programms “Stadtteile
84. The argument that Prenzlauer Berg is gentrifying has been contested by Häußer- mit besonderem Entwicklungsbedarf—die soziale Stadt“ nach vier Jahren Programmlaufzeit
mann and Kapphan (see note 67). Critics find their arguments wanting. Se e (Berlin, 2004), available at http://www.sozialestadt.de/veroeffentlichungen/eval-
Karen Lenhart, “Berlin Transformations: Another View,” International Journal of uationsberichte/zwischenevaluierung-2004/pdf/DF8811.pdf.
Urban and Regional Research 26, no. 4 (2002): 855-9; and Neil Brenner, “Berlin’s 102. Wolfgang Krumm, Evaluation des Berliner Quartiersmanagementprogramms. Informa -
Transformations: Postmodern, Postfordist … or Neoliberal?” International Journal tionen zur Raumentwicklung, (Bonn, 2005), 123-32.
of Urban and Regional Research 26, no. 4 (2002): 635-42. 103. Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik, see note 84), footnotes 2, 3.
85. Myron A. Levine, “Government Policy, the Local State and Gentrification: The 104. Mayer (see note 41).
Case of Prenzlauer Berg (Berlin), Germany,” Journal of Urban Affairs 26, no. 1 105. Davis (see note 35), 263-84.
(2004): 89-108. 106. Janice Bockmeyer in this issue.
46 47
Hilary Silver
107. Ingeborg Beer and Reinfried Musch, “Be r l i n - K r e u z b e r g — Kottbusser Tor,” in
Socially Integrative City, an initial appraisal of the federal/Länder programme “Districts
with Special Development Needs—The Socially Integrative City,” ed., German Institute
of Urbans Affairs (Berlin, 2002).
108. On the rise of a “parallel society” with multiculturalism, see Peter Schneider,
“The New Berlin Wall,” New York Times Magazine, 4 December 2005, 66-71.
109. Volker Eick, “New Strategies of Policing the Poor: Berlin’s Neo-Liberal Security
System,” Policing and Society 13, no. 4: 365-79.
110. Ibid. One example is in Helmholtzplatz in Prenzlauer Berg where youth keep
the peace between families and the alternative scene, including the homeless,
dog-owners, and alcoholics.
111. There is one respect in which the European city is not more integrative than the
American city: physical accessibility to the disabled. Despite a large number of
war wounded, the American disability rights movement and Americans with
Disabilities Act is far more advanced and inspired that comparable movements
in Ge r m a n y. See Carole Poore, Disability in Twentieth-Century German Culture
(Ann Arbor, forthcoming 2007).
112. For the official integration policy of the Land of Berlin, see Commissioner for
Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin (see note 56).
113. Davis (see note 101).
114. Campbell (see note 20), 177.
48